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EXTERIORITY IS NOT A NEGATION
BUT A MARVEL: HOSPITALITY,
TERRORISM, LEVINAS, BEOWULF
Eileen A. Joy
This essay considers Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of hospitality in relation to the “isolated and heroic being 
that the state produces by its virile virtues,” through an analysis of female Chechen suicide terrorists in contem-
porary Russia and the figure of Grendel in the Old English poem Beowulf, in order to raise some questions about 
the relation between violence, justice, and sovereignty, both in the Middle Ages and in our own time.
He who does not realize to what extent shifting fortune and necessity hold in subjection every human 
spirit, cannot regard as fellow-creatures nor love as he loves himself those whom chance has separated from 
him by an abyss. The variety of constraints pressing upon man give rise to the illusion of several distinct 
species that cannot communicate. Only he who has measured the dominion of force, and knows how not 
to respect it, is capable of love and justice.
—Simone Weil, “The Iliad, or The Poem of Force”
Prolegomenon: Beyond the State in the State
In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida argues that Levinas’s philosophy, 
 especially in Totality and Infi nity, has bequeathed to us an “immense treatise of 
hospitality.” According to Derrida, although “the word ‘hospitality’ occurs rela-
tively seldom in Totality and Infi nity, the word ‘welcome’ is unarguably one of the 
most frequent and determinative words in that text.”1 At the very outset of Totality 
and Infi nity, Levinas writes about the Other as the “Stranger [l’Etranger] . . . who 
disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez soi].”2 In the wake of this dis-
turbance, the ethical subject “is incapable of approaching the Other with empty 
hands,” and by way of “conversation” she welcomes the Other’s “expression, in 
which at each instant he overfl ows the idea a thought would carry away from 
it.”3 The welcoming [accueillance] of the expression of the stranger-Other is a 
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welcoming of a teaching [enseignement] that “comes from the exterior” and in 
which “the very epiphany of the face is produced.”4 This is a “face” that is not 
a material face, per se—the specifi c physical visage of a specifi c person—but is, 
rather, an “exteriority that is not reducible . . . to the interiority of memory,” an 
expression of being that “breaks through the envelopings” and façades of material 
form, exceeds any possible preconceptions, and calls into question the subject’s 
“ joyous possession of the world.”5 At the same time, because “the body does not 
happen as an accident to the soul,” the physical face is the important “mode in 
which a being, neither spatial nor foreign to geometrical or physical extension, 
exists separately.” It is the “somewhere of a dwelling” of a being—of its solitary 
and separated being-with-itself.6
While Levinas describes the home, or dwelling, as a site of inwardness [intimité], 
from which the subject ventures outside herself (and therefore, the real home is 
always a rootless, wandering mode of being), he also points out that this inward-
ness “opens up in a home which is situated in that outside—for the home, as 
a building, belongs to a world of objects.”7 The home possesses two facades, 
and, thereby, two positions, for it “has a ‘street front,’ but also its secrecy. . . . 
Circulating between visibility and invisibility, one is always bound for the inte-
rior of which one’s home, one’s corner, one’s tent, one’s cave is the vestibule.”8 
The home, then, is both the architectural site fi lled with material furnishings 
[Bien-meubles, or movable goods] that, by its very nature, is “hospitable to the 
proprietor,” as well as the site of interiority in which the subject withdraws from 
the elements and can “recollect” herself.9 Recollection [recueillance], for Levinas, 
is a kind of “coming to oneself, a retreat home with oneself as in a land of refuge, 
which answers to a hospitality, an expectancy, a human welcome.” This is, in 
essence, a kind of self-possession made possible by the subject possessing a home 
in which she is able to be welcomed to herself, which welcoming constitutes the 
condition by which a certain aff ection for herself is “produced as a gentleness that 
spreads over the face of things” and makes the welcome of the stranger-Other 
possible.10
As a result, the ethical self is also a “sub-jectum; it is under the weight of the 
universe, responsible for everything. The unity of the universe is not what my 
gaze embraces in its unity of apperception, but what is incumbent on me from all 
sides . . . accuses me, is my aff air.”11 The “I” is ultimately the “non-interchangeable 
par excellence” and also “the state of being a hostage,” and it is only “through 
the condition of being hostage that there can be in this world pity, compassion, 
pardon and proximity.” Even more pointedly, Levinas writes, “the word I means 
here I am, answering for everything and everyone,” and we are always summoned 
“as someone irreplaceable.”12 Levinas’s philosophy of the ethical relation to the 
stranger-Other poses a stern (and perhaps wildly unrealizable) political impera-
tive, for, as Levinas himself puts it, “the fi rst, fundamental, and unforgettable 
exigency of justice is the love of the other man in his uniqueness.”13
In Derrida’s view, Levinas’s ideas regarding the welcoming of the enigmatic 
face of the stranger-Other is a type of hospitality that is “not simply some region of 
ethics” or “the name of a problem in law or politics: it is ethicity itself, the whole 
and the principle of ethics.”14 More importantly, Levinas’s “infi nite and uncon-
ditional hospitality” raises the diffi  cult question of whether or not Levinas’s phi-
losophy “would be able to found a law and politics, beyond the familial dwelling, 
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within a society, nation, State, or Nation-State.”15 How would such an ethics be 
“regulated in a particular or juridical practice? How might it, in turn, regulate a 
particular politics or law? Might it give rise to—keeping the same names—a pol-
itics, a law, or a justice for which none of the concepts we have inherited under 
these names would be adequate?”16 How, also, might Levinas’s thought be seen 
as a provocation to “think the passage between the ethical . . . and the political, 
at a moment in the history of humanity and of the Nation-State when the per-
secution of all of these hostages—the foreigner, the immigrant (with or without 
papers), the exile, the refugee, those without a country, or State, the displaced 
person or population (so many distinctions that call for careful analysis)—seems, 
on every continent, open to a cruelty without precedent”?17
In Derrida’s view, Levinas, through “discreet though transparent allu-
sions . . . oriented our gaze toward what is happening today,” to the call of “the 
refugees of every kind . . . for a change in the socio- and geo-political space.”18 
One could even say that present crimes against humanity actually intensify the 
urgency of Levinas’s voice on the matter, and we might also ask how Levinas’s 
hospitality marks (or opens) an important door [porte] into a dwelling that must 
ultimately be “beyond the State in the State”?19 Levinas touches upon the ques-
tion in his conclusion to Totality and Infi nity, where he writes that “[i]n the mea-
sure that the face of the Other relates us with a third party, the metaphysical 
relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of a We, aspires to a State, 
institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. But politics left to itself 
bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the other who have given rise 
to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in absentia.”20 
Although the individual ethical subject is ultimately made invisible by the state’s 
insistence on “universality,” and therefore hospitality has to defi ne itself, in cer-
tain singular situations, against the state, the state nevertheless reserves a frame-
work for it (through various of its institutions, such as citizenship and law courts 
and bills of rights), and also operates as a placeholder of borders that will need to 
be transgressed in order for true ethics to be possible. Although the democratic 
state, in Levinas’s view, can function as a rational political order that ends exile 
and violence and endows men with freedom, the world in which the welcoming 
of the stranger-Other is possible will always be radically diff erent from the state, 
which, “with its realpolitik, comes from another universe, sealed off  from sensi-
bility, or protest by ‘beautiful souls,’ or tears shed by an ‘unhappy unconscious-
ness.’ ”21 There is a necessity for a type of politics that purposefully forces open a 
door [porte] in the place that marks the border between the enclosure of the state 
and the more perfect future that lies beyond it, and this politics is often accom-
plished, in diff erent times and places, by what Levinas calls the “isolated and 
heroic being that the State produces by its virile virtues. Such a being confronts 
death out of pure courage and whatever the cause for which he dies.”22
What I off er in this essay is a consideration of Levinas’s philosophy of hospi-
tality in relation to that “isolated and heroic being that the State produces by its 
virile virtues,” through an analysis of the ethical “problem” of terrorism in the 
separate cases of female Chechen suicide bombers in contemporary Russia and 
Grendel in the Old English poem Beowulf. In the trauma that is created in the 
wake of disturbance of the violent, destroying stranger-Other—such as a Grendel 
or a suicide terrorist—how is welcoming, or hospitality (the very foundation of 
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ethicity), even possible? If the actual, material face is the “somewhere of a dwell-
ing” of the stranger-Other whom we must welcome, how do the faces of those 
who have been determined ahead of time to be too exterior (read: too foreign or 
inhuman) forbid, yet also call more urgently for our welcoming of them? If the 
home constitutes the site of recollection (a coming-to-oneself ) that is the condition 
for welcoming (a going-out-of-oneself to the Other), what happens to the ethical 
project of hospitality when the stranger-Other is actively trying to destroy that 
home (perhaps out of anomie, but also rage, over his or her own homelessness)? 
If, as Levinas argues, the “positive deployment of a pacifi c relation with the 
other, without frontier or any  negativity, is  produced in language,”23 how can 
we make peace with those to whom we refuse to speak, and who, in turn, refuse 
to speak to us? In what way does terroristic violence (whether the anthrophagy 
of a Grendel or the belted bomb of a suicide terrorist) simultaneously summon 
and accuse us as those who are irreplaceable? How, fi nally, do these terroristic 
fi gures signify and enact a type of violence (even, a type of radical evil) that the 
state itself simultaneously exercises and punishes?
Most likely written in a tenth- to eleventh-century Anglo-Saxon monastic 
setting24 that would have been structured by a Christian ethics of hospitality, and 
taking as its subject an earlier, proto-Christian cultural milieu (Scandinavia in 
the geardagum, ‘old days’) that was also structured, in important ways, by partic-
ular socially regulated modes of hospitality, Beowulf reveals many of the fi ssures 
that often open up when the moral dictums “welcome the Stranger” and “love 
thy neighbor as thyself” run up against the troubling sociopolitical question, 
“what if the Stranger, or my neighbor, is also my enemy?” The dead bodies 
of Chechen women who have killed themselves and others in the course of 
their suicide missions within Russia pose the same troubling question and also 
serve as placeholders of Levinasian “faces” that, because they are both vulnera-
bly and nakedly human but also enclose a terrifying will-to-death, challenge our 
ability to welcome the expressions of what we believe are the radically exterior 
beings concealed within. In the same way, the disfi gured (and monstrous) yet still 
human form of Grendel, whom Beowulf describes as an uncuðne nið [unknown 
violence] (276),25 both refuses all gestures of welcoming and recollection, while 
also calling into question the limits of the ethics (and even, the law) of hospitality 
that were clearly important in both Anglo-Saxon England and in the world of 
the poem. Indeed, Grendel’s presence, both as aggressive intruder, and later, as 
displayed body pieces (severed shoulder and head), inside the ceremonial dwelling of 
the great hall of Heorot points to a certain violent displacement and dispossession 
that seems intrinsic to the guest-host relationship, especially in the world of a 
poem where almost all of the violent episodes—between men and monsters, but 
also between men and men—happens within the walls of spaces, whether halls 
or caves, designated as home. As John Michael has written regarding the current 
“war on terror” and Derrida’s writing, by way of Levinas, on hospitality, “If the 
guest has power over the host, the power of a dangerous and perhaps impossible 
ethical demand, no one can ever be at home anywhere.”26
I do not wish, at any point in this essay, to imply that there is a one-to-one 
correlation between the female Chechen suicide bombers and Grendel, for their 
“cases,” as it were, are very diff erent: the former are real persons situated in a very 
real and troubling contemporary history, whereas Grendel is a fi ctional bogeyman 
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situated in a pseudo-historical, medieval text. And whereas the political crisis 
and motives of the suicide bombers can, without too much trouble, be well 
articulated, Grendel is a fi gure who appears to come from nowhere bearing an 
inscrutable hatred. But as fi gures bearing terroristic violence, they both pose a 
certain challenge to societies that claim not to know them nor to understand their 
aggression (or both). At the same time these societies are themselves caught up in 
cycles of aggression and murder for which they have devised legalistic and other 
justifi cations, yet terrorism, for these societies, is always supposedly prohibited 
and can only ever come from the outside. Both the suicide bombers and Grendel 
engage in forms of supposedly extralegal force that frustrate the very self-identity 
of societies that consider themselves “just” or “right,” and that either see no 
remedy under their laws for these terrifying invaders, or will not admit the 
possibility of one. While both the Chechen women and Grendel are viewed in 
their respective cultures as fi gures of exorbitant exteriority, nevertheless, they are 
mainly terrifying for the ways in which they bring to vivid life (and death) the 
obscene violence at the interior heart of states that mark the places of supposedly 
more ethical communities. Finally, through their ferocious aggression—which 
aggression, I would argue, is born out of particular historical moments as a kind of 
structural excess—both the Chechen women and Grendel perform what Levinas 
calls a “deadly jump” [salto mortale] over the abyss that separates the present from 
death, and thereby enter the horizon of the “not-yet,” which is “more vast than 
history itself” and “in which history is judged.”27
It Gleams Like a Splendor But Does Not Deliver Itself
In Levinas’s philosophy, “being-for-the-other” posits the possibility of tran-
scending the burden of self and ego through a face-to-face relationship—what 
Levinas terms la face-à-face sans intermediare, “a facing without intermediary”—
with the Other, who, “under all the particular forms of expression where the 
Other, already in a character’s skin, plays a role—is . . . pure expression, an extradi-
tion without defense or cover, precisely the extreme rectitude of a facing, which 
in this nudity is an exposure unto death: nudity, destitution, passivity, and pure 
vulnerability.”28 Further, this “pure expression” always exceeds any fi gurative 
limits we might put on it—“Expression, or the face, overfl ows images.”29
Even though I know that, in Levinas’s scheme of things, the face is not really 
a face, per se, but rather an expression that exceeds fi guration, I have thought, 
obsessively, about the face of Zulikhan Elikhadzhiyeva, the twenty-year-old 
Chechen woman who approached the admissions booth of an outdoor rock 
festival at Moscow’s Tushino airfi eld on 5 July 2003 and detonated the explo-
sives strapped to her belt, killing only herself (another female bomber who was 
with her managed to kill herself and fourteen others).30 Browsing the Internet 
one day searching for pictures of this event, partly due to my curiosity about 
the phenomenon of women who are suicide terrorists, I came across a photo-
graph of Elikhadzhiyeva lying on her back between police barricades, blood 
splattered on the bottom edges of her shirt, one fi st partially clenched over her 
heart, a beer can overturned on the ground beside her head, her eyes closed, 
her mouth half-open—the scene is almost peaceful, and her face, serene, if also 
vulnerable.31
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I could not get Elikhadzhiyeva’s face out of my mind when I fi rst saw it, 
nor can I, even now. Elikhadzhiyeva’s face haunts me precisely because it is 
what Levinas would have said is not really a face, but a facade, “whose essence is 
indiff erence, cold splendor, and silence,” and in which “the thing which keeps 
its secret is exposed and enclosed in its monumental essence and in its myth, in 
which it gleams like a splendor but does not deliver itself.”32 While there are 
some, I know, who will claim that it is not possible to be captivated (which is to 
say, to be struck with wonder) by such a face, the possessor of which is a suicide 
bomber (whom we call a monster and for whom some will argue no empathy is 
possible or even required), I would argue that, at the very least, this face—which 
is extraordinary in its exteriority—is a marvel that commands our attention and 
challenges us to take on the task, in Levinas’s words, of responding “to the 
life of the other man,” for we “do not have the right to leave him alone at his 
death.”33
Between October 2002, when roughly forty Chechen rebels, including over 
a dozen women, seized a theater in Moscow in the middle of a musical perfor-
mance and held 800 theatergoers hostage, and September 2004, when more than 
a dozen Chechen rebels, also including women, seized a school in Beslan (in the 
southern republic of North Ossetia), Chechens and Russians have witnessed the 
emergence of what many consider to be a shocking phenomenon—female sui-
cide bombers.34 Because many Chechens reject the idea that these women have 
embraced a radical Islamic fundamentalism, and many Russians, conversely, have 
assumed that these women embody what they see as the “Palestinianization” of 
the Chechen rebellion,35 a certain tension, confusion, and even hysteria attaches 
to the ways in which ordinary Russians and Chechens, government offi  cials, and 
the international press have attempted to describe them. It has been said about the 
female Chechen suicide bombers, alternatively, that they have been kidnapped 
by Islamic extremists, given psychotropic drugs, and then raped as part of their 
coercion into doing what no woman would supposedly do of her own accord;36 
that they are emotionless “brick walls,” “pre-programmed,” “brainwashed,” and 
“de-humanized”;37 that they are suff ering from post-traumatic stress disorder;38 
that they are blackmailed “zombies”;39 and that they are the harbingers of the fact 
that “something has come unglued at the heart of Chechen society.”40
Standing in stark opposition to the idea that the female bombers are some-
how not in their right mind, or that they have been coerced against their will, 
are the statements of the women themselves, or of those who might have known 
something about their motives. In September 2003, an anonymous Chechen 
woman (going by the pseudonym “Kowa”) told a BBC World Service reporter, 
“I have only one dream now, only one mission—to blow myself up somewhere 
in Russia, ideally in Moscow. . . . To take as many Russian lives as possible—
this is the only way to stop the Russians from killing my people. . . . Maybe this 
way they will get the message once and for all.”41 A surviving hostage of the 
Chechen rebel takeover of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2003 
told an Associated Press reporter that one of her female captors, whose husband 
and brother had been killed in the war with Russia, said the following: “I have 
nothing to lose, I have nobody left. So I’ll go all the way with this, even though 
I don’t think it’s the right thing to do.”42 Speaking of one of the fi rst female 
Chechen suicide bombers, Elza Gazuyeva, who in November 2001 killed herself 
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and a Russian commander who she believed had ordered the execution of her 
husband, a woman interviewed in Grozny said of Gazuyeva, “She was, is and 
will remain a heroine for us.”43 Lisa Ling, who traveled to Chechnya in order to 
interview families of female suicide bombers for a National Geographic documen-
tary on the subject, said in an interview that the female bombers “were normal 
girls” who, nevertheless, also “saw no way out. They saw their lives . . . as too 
diffi  cult to handle, and when they reached that stage, in their minds, taking out 
the enemy was an opportunity to become a hero.”44
It is important to understand the larger historical context within which 
Elikhadzhiyeva and other Chechen women have committed themselves to mur-
der and suicide—a context, moreover, that can be seen as conducive to, simulta-
neously, inhumanity, insanity, and the completely rational (and sane) desire for a 
revenge that could only be accomplished extralegally. Since 1999, when Russia 
reintroduced military forces into Chechnya in order to suppress the Chechen 
rebellion (a rebellion they had “put down” once before with massive bombing 
and other war campaigns in 1994 and 1995), but especially after the 9/11 attacks 
on the World Trade Center, when Russian president Valdmir Putin declared 
that the struggle against Chechen rebels was simultaneously a struggle against al-
Qaeda–sponsored terrorism,45 Chechen citizens have been plunged into a night-
marish cycle of vicious abuse, including abductions, torture, rape, assassination, 
and mass extermination. Of particular concern to international human rights 
organizations have been the systematic “sweep” operations and nighttime raids, 
on the part of the Russian military, that have resulted in the “disappearance” 
(likely after torture and extrajudicial execution) of thousands of Chechens since 
1999.46 According to a Human Rights Watch “Briefi ng Paper” on the subject 
published in March 2005, the Russian government “contends that its operations 
in Chechnya are its contribution to the global campaign against terrorism. But the 
human rights violations Russian forces have committed there, reinforced by the 
climate of impunity the government has created, have not only brought untold 
suff ering to hundreds of thousands of civilians but also undermined the goal of 
fi ghting terrorism.” In addition, “as part of Russia’s policy of ‘Chechenization’ 
of the confl ict, pro-Moscow Chechen forces have begun to play an increas-
ingly active role in the confl ict, gradually replacing federal troops as the main 
perpetrators of ‘disappearances’ and other human rights violations.”47 Most of 
the “disappeared” are men between the ages of eighteen and forty, although 
children and women have also been targeted, and although local and federal 
prosecutors routinely investigate abductions reported by families of the victims, 
no actual convictions have ever resulted from these investigations. According to 
Human Rights Watch, most of the cases “are closed or suspended after several 
months ‘due to the impossibility of establishing the identity of perpetrators,’ ” 
and even “when detainees held in unacknowledged detention are released and 
the perpetrators established, no accountability process takes place.”48 There has 
also been evidence of Russian military forces burying executed Chechens in 
mass graves.49 So, while on the one hand, the state, in the form of local and fed-
eral government authorities, is “investigating” the abductions and extrajudicial 
executions of Chechen citizens, with the other hand, in the form of its military, 
it is burying the evidence of the murder of its own citizens. To add to the general 
terror and despair of all this, the 2005 “Briefi ng Paper” also notes that in Grozny, 
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the  capital of Chechnya, “most people . . . live in the partial ruins of apartment 
buildings damaged by relentless bombing campaigns. There is no running water 
and power outages are frequent.” In other areas, people “who have survived the 
chaos of two wars and actively protested the abuses perpetrated in their villages 
are now too terrifi ed to open their door even to their neighbors.”50 Such is the 
bleak world in which Elikhadzhiyeva and other female suicide terrorists were 
formed.
It has to be admitted that suicide terrorists do not play fair, since, as Jean 
Baudrillard writes, “they put their own deaths into play—to which there is no 
possible response (‘they are cowards’),” but they are also attempting to contest a 
system “whose very excess of power poses an insoluble challenge,” to which “the 
terrorists respond with a defi nitive act that is also not susceptible of exchange.”51 
In turn, the government’s response is typically one of complete refusal to nego-
tiate and fl at-out extermination. After the siege at the school in Beslan, Putin 
told the press, “We shall fi ght against them, throw them in prisons, and destroy 
them.”52 Putin’s comments are typical of most state governments’ responses to 
terrorists. In April of 2004, in a speech delivered in Kansas City, Missouri, that 
referred to terrorist attacks in the cities of Karbala, Najaf, and Baghdad in Iraq, 
Vice President Dick Cheney stated, “Such an enemy cannot be deterred, cannot 
be contained, cannot be appeased, or negotiated with. It can only be destroyed. 
And that is the business at hand.”53 On both sides, this is a zero–sum game, and 
it also raises the diffi  cult question posed by Derrida: “What diff erence is there 
between, on the one hand, the force that can be just, or in any case deemed legiti-
mate (not only an instrument in the service of the law but the practice and even 
the realization, the essence of droit), and on the other other hand the violence that 
one always deems unjust? What is a just force or a non-violent force?”54 Because 
the current government of Russia, and the United States, whatever evidence to 
the contrary, do not identify themselves as tyrannies, but rather, as progressive 
democracies that supposedly set certain limits to the government’s use of force, 
terrorism—in particular, suicide terrorism—poses a special problem, because the 
 perpetrator cannot be brought to court. And yet, suicide terrorism—at least, 
in the case of the female Chechens—can sometimes be a violence of desperate 
last resort.55 It does not represent the fi rst time the stranger-Other, who is also 
a citizen, has knocked on (or blown open) the door of the state and demanded 
recognition.56 And in the case of Chechnya, especially, where the perpetrators 
of abuse against civilians, in “the vast majority of cases . . . are unquestionably 
government agents,”57 the avenue of legal recourse for redress of abuses against 
civilians is obviously not open, except as an apparition.
We must never forget that terrorists are real persons with real lives grounded in 
all the material and psychic particularities of the local—Zulikhan Elikhadzhiyeva, 
for instance, lived with her sister in a brick house in a small Chechen village 
and studied at the medical vocational school there.58 The two Chechen women, 
Amanat Nagayeva and Satsita Dzhbirkhanova, who brought down two Russian 
passenger planes in August 2004, killing themselves and eighty-nine other pas-
sengers, lived with two other women in a cramped, bombed-out apartment 
building in Grozny and worked selling clothing and other goods in the central 
market.59 In his study My Life Is a Weapon, Christoph Reuter writes that suicide 
attackers “are not cruise missiles on two legs, killing machines who come out 
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of nowhere with the wrath of God or the murderous orders of a cult leader pro-
grammed into them. They are, whatever lengths they or we will go to forget 
it, people—individuals with families rooted in a given society.”60 The Chechen 
women who have become suicide bombers have been living in conditions of 
absolute poverty and desolation—both physical and psychic—and their acts of 
terrorism can be seen as the last gestures of an extreme desperation. But we 
cannot forget that these gestures are also immoral acts of violence that maimed 
and killed others who were, like the female bombers themselves, “ordinary 
civilians.”61
Just as “we” refuse to negotiate with terrorists—just as we withhold, in other 
words, the gift of welcoming through language—“they” also refuse to welcome 
us through language, and instead, write their suicide letters on our collective 
body with their weapons and render us incapable of returning anything to them 
except our hatred, which they do not stay to receive. But our understanding of 
these women, if we are willing to embark on such a project, will have to begin 
with an understanding of the general perception of them, grounded in the order 
of the symbolic, as monsters. As Jeff rey Cohen reminds us, the monster’s body is 
always a cultural body: “The monster is born . . . as an embodiment of a certain 
cultural moment—of a time, a feeling, and a place. The monster’s body quite liter-
ally incorporates fear, desire, anxiety, and fantasy (ataractic or incendiary), giving 
them life and an uncanny independence.”62 In his “seven theses toward under-
standing cultures through the monsters they bear,” Cohen argues that the monster 
always embodies diff erence writ large (usually along lines that are sexual, racial, 
and cultural), and “the boundaries between personal and national bodies blur” in 
the body of the monster, which always threatens “to fragment the delicate matrix 
of relational systems that unite every private body to the public world.”63 The 
female Chechen suicide bombers are especially troubling in this scenario because 
they bring together in their cultural bodies two “signs” that have traditionally 
terrifi ed through their Otherness: “woman” and “nonwhite” (what Cohen terms, 
following two popular horror fi lms from the 1950s, She and Them!).64
Also central to the issue of what might be called the troubling, yet intimate 
alterity of these women is the name given to them, as a collectivity, by the 
Russian government and broadcast widely by the international press: they are 
the “black widows” of Chechnya—that is to say, they are the actual widows 
(the wives, yes, but also the  mothers, sisters, and daughters) of men killed in 
an ongoing war with Russia that has claimed over 100,000 lives; they are also 
venomous black widow spiders who kill with one bite. Apparently, the Chechen 
women fi rst earned this moniker during the rebel takeover of the Dubrovka 
Theater when they were seen on Russian TV wearing black hijabs and explo-
sive-laden belts.65 Furthermore, the supposed leader of these women has been 
referred to as “Black Fatima,” a nickname that incorporates racial and religious 
fears.66 They are therefore both intimately familiar, yet also monstrously Other, 
and it is precisely because of their intimacy—because they are, ultimately, like 
us—that they drive us to the language of exteriority: we say that they are inhu-
man, and even  monstrous, and their acts, evil and unspeakable. We say, in as 
many ways as we can, they are not like us.
According to Cohen, the monster resides in the “marginal geography of the 
Exterior, beyond the limits of the Thinkable, a place that is doubly dangerous: 
9781403973078ts12.indd   245 9/28/2007   4:19:38 PM
E I L E E N  A .  J OY246
simultaneously ‘exorbitant’ and ‘quite close.’ ”67 The female Chechen terrorists 
are strange to many Russians (and even to some Chechens), yet also lie very close 
to the heart of what Russia is—a state that originated and maintains its heg-
emonic authority with violence against persons and groups of people who do not 
possess equivalent force: they are Levinas’s “isolated and heroic being[s],” whom 
the State produces by its “virile virtues”—and therefore, it will never be a matter 
of simply driving them back to the wilderness from which they supposedly came, 
nor of just destroying them (Russia’s “offi  cial policy”). If the only policy against 
terrorists is to hunt them down and destroy—that is, to kill—them, without con-
versation, they will keep returning to us, bearing the gift of their deaths and our 
own murder. If we cannot approach these fi gures except as monsters, as inhuman, 
as illegible, then we cannot embark on what Levinas calls the “absolute adven-
ture” of pluralistic being, which is peace itself, but only when we understand 
that peace “cannot be identifi ed with the end of combats that cease for want of 
combatants, by the defeat of some and the victory of the others, that is, with 
cemeteries or future universal empires. Peace must be my peace, in a relation that 
starts from an I and goes to the other, in desire and goodness, where the I both 
maintains itself and exists without egoism.”68 But this kind of desiring, which 
requires that we turn our home (our recollection of ourselves-to-ourselves) into 
a kind of wandering that allows us to meet and welcome the stranger-Other and 
even behold her—behold the face of Zulikhan Elikhadzhiyeva—on the plane 
of the expression of her most enraged and suicidal being, currently exceeds our 
grasp. It is almost too much to ask. And yet, by her death, she both demands and 
escapes our attention.
That Terrible and Splendidly Made Spectacle
To Derrida’s question regarding how Levinas’s ethics of hospitality might be reg-
ulated in a juridical practice, or whether or not it could give rise to the law, early 
English law codes, such as those of Ine, Alfred, and Æthelstan, demonstrate some 
of the ways in which the fi gure of the stranger, or lordless man, held a promi-
nent place in the juridical system of Anglo-Saxon England. In the law codes of 
Alfred (871–899) drafted after the treaty with Guthrum in 886 (referred to as 
the Danelaw), and modifi ed by Edward the Elder (Alfred’s successor, 899–924), 
it is stipulated that
Gif man gehadodne oððe ælðeodigne þurh enig ðing forræde æt féo oððe æt feore, 
þonne sceal him cyng beon—oððan eorl ðær on lande—7 bisceop ðere þeode for 
mæg 7 for mundboran, buton he elles oðerne hæbbe; 7 bete man georne be ðam 
þe seo dæd sy Criste 7 cyninge, swa hit gebyrige; oððe þa dæde wrece swiðe deope 
þe cyning sy on ðeode.
[If any attempt is made to deprive in any wise a man in orders, or a stranger, of 
either his goods or his life, the king—or the earl of the province—and the bishop 
of the diocese shall act as his kinsmen and protectors, unless he has some other. 
And such compensation as is due shall be promptly paid to Christ and the king 
according to the nature of the offence; or the king within whose dominions the 
deed is done shall avenge it to the uttermost.]69
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In the early English law codes in general (beginning with the seventh-century laws 
of Ine and extending through the eleventh-century reign of Cnut) the stranger is 
most often referred to as ælðeodigne [alien person] or feorcumen man [man who comes 
from afar; foreigner], and occasionally the word gest [guest] is also used, with the 
term gestliðnesse [literally ‘guestliness’] denoting “hospitality.” Clearly, the displaced 
person without specifi c kinship or local group connections held a special status 
within Anglo-Saxon England, and Alfred’s law, cited above, could even be said to 
denote a space of legal welcoming of (and hospitality for) the displaced person into 
the domestic kin-dwelling and protection of the state. In the law codes of Cnut 
(1020–23) we can even see the codifi cation of a moral concern for the treatment of 
strangers, where it states that “he who pronounces a worse judgment on a friendless 
man or a stranger from a distance than on his own fellows, injures himself.”70
But in the law codes of Æthelstan (924–939), we can see how the legal welcom-
ing and protection of the stranger also belies a fear of the individual who is too 
foreign, too displaced, or too unwilling to be attached to the state through a locally 
circumscribed domicile:
Ond we cwædon be þam hlafordleasan mannum, ðe mon nán ryht ætbegytan ne 
mæg, þæt mon beode ðære mægþe, ðæt hi hine to folcryhte gehamette 7 him hlaford 
fi nden on folcgemote. 7 gif hi hine ðonne begytan nyllen oððe ne mægen to þam 
andagan, ðonne beo he syþþan fl yma, 7 hine lecge for ðeof se þe him tocume.
[And we have declared respecting those lordless men from whom no law may be 
obtained, that the kin should be commanded to domicile him to common law, and 
find for him a lord in the district meeting. And if they will not or cannot produce 
him at the appointed day, then he is afterwards a fugitive outlaw, and let anyone 
slay him for a thief who can come at him.]71
Even earlier, in the law codes of Ine (688–725), we can see that the status of the 
foreigner was ultimately precarious:
Gif feorcund mon oððe fremde butan wege geond wudu gonge 7 ne hrieme ne 
horn blawe, for ðeof he bið to profi anne, oððe to sleanne oððe to áleisanne.
[If a man from afar, or a stranger, travels through a wood off the highway and nei-
ther shouts nor blows a horn, he shall be assumed to be a thief, and as such may be 
either slain or put to ransom.]72
The line separating the sacred foreigner whose body and possessions should be 
protected from the person who is available to be killed (by anyone, no less) precisely 
because he either does not signify his presence or refuses the invitation into the 
state’s dwelling is very tenuous here. One could say that all of the law codes cited 
above are predicated, in the fi nal analysis, upon the state’s desire both to regulate 
and contain immigrants and disenfranchised persons (as well as eliminate them 
when they cannot be contained), and also to profi t from them through fees of 
protection and taxation. The “fate of the foreigner in the Middle Ages—and in 
many respects also today,” as Julia Kristeva has written, “depended on a subtle, 
sometimes brutal, play between caritas and the political jurisdiction.”73
Anglo-Saxon law codes point to a legally codifi ed ethics of care for the strang-
er-Other who is both threatened yet also threatening in his singularity, and they 
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likely arise from a society that we know, from its imaginative and other literature, 
was deeply concerned with what might be called the protocols of hospitality.74 
And these protocols—in the absence of the law, or beyond the law’s reach—
functioned as the important means whereby those who were Other to each other 
could communicate, without hostility, in spaces of common dwelling, whose doors, 
whether barred or open, marked the threshold between the “inside” of the com-
munal dwelling from the “outside” of the stateless forest. Importantly, the very 
idea of the extralegal was enclosed within the Anglo-Saxon legal defi nition of the 
fugitive as one who was exlex, or utlah [outlaw]. According to Michael Moore, 
“The forest was the proper haunt for such fi gures, ranging far from the houses 
and protection of the village. No food or lodging was to be off ered to the utlah.” 
Further, “These criminals, conceived of as demonic creatures outside the bound-
aries of humanity, were pushed away from the society, absolutely excluded from 
the shelter of the community and its legal world and suff ering what amounted to 
‘civil death.’ ”75 In medieval Ireland and Iceland, “the term ‘wolf ’ was applied to 
any dangerous foreigner who did not belong to the local community. Wolfi shness 
was also thought to be an attribute of the medieval outlaw, who was deemed to 
become wolf-like,” demonstrating that to exist outside the law, or outside of the 
known domicile of a particular kin group with specifi c connections to the state, 
was to be considered non-human, even monstrous.76 As Moore writes, “Such acts 
of exclusion helped to form the community as a legal subject: the law was made 
by and for the village or kingdom, at the same time enclosing and defi ning it” and 
“the concept of outlawry was fundamental to establishing the inner, safe circle of 
communal law and royal power.”77 The medieval social community, then, had 
need of an extralegal “outside” in order to defi ne itself as bounded, while, at the 
same time, because of certain moral imperatives, rooted either in Christian belief 
or more archaic rituals of hospitality, and also for the purposes of strengthening 
its numbers (both human and economic), that community also had to leave a door 
open for the welcome of the stranger-Other.
In the realm of Old English poetry, as Hugh Magennis tells us, a “concern 
with ideas of community and of the relationship of individuals to communities is 
widely evident.” Further, Old English poetic texts often “raise unsettling ques-
tions” about “received notions of community,” which are refl ected in the antith-
esis between the corpus’s positive images of “warmth and security,” especially of 
feasting and drinking in secular halls, and the reverse images of “dislocation and 
alienation,” as we get in Seafarer, Wanderer, and The Ruin.78 The Anglo-Saxon 
hall—both real and poetic—is an especially confl icted site, as both tribal seat and 
the civitas (or state) itself, for it is not only the place where a community gathers, 
happily and in supposed concord, around a meal and drink, but is also “the seat of 
business, of political brokering and confl icts, where power . . . [is] exercised.”79
 Themes of authority and the betrayal of that authority are, fi ttingly enough, 
often played out in the hall, and this is especially so in Beowulf, where the poet 
describes Heorot at one point as “fi lled with friends within” who do not, “as yet 
practice  treachery” (1017–19). One could argue that the gestures of welcoming 
in Beowulf, which are clearly the primary instrument of the ethico-politics of the 
world of the story—from the coast guard’s welcome of Beowulf and his men into 
Daneland (lines 237–57, 287–300, and 316–19), to Hrothgar’s servant’s welcome of 
them into Heorot itself (lines 333–39), to Hrothgar’s initial welcome of Beowulf 
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(lines 457–90), to Wealhtheow’s bearing of the banquet feast cup to Beowulf after 
he has killed Grendel (lines 1216–31), to Hygelac’s re-welcoming of Beowulf 
into Geatland (lines 1975–98)—are all fraught with the anxiety and tension that 
always arises when ideas of sovereignty (whether of the individual, the family/
tribe, or the larger polis-state) come up against an ethics of hospitality that is sup-
posed to transcend those sovereignties. So, for example, when Beowulf returns 
to Hygelac’s court after his adventures in Daneland, Hygelac commands his hall 
to be cleared for the “foot-guests” [ feðegestum] (1976) to whom he off ers “earnest 
words” [meaglum wordum] and cups of mead [meoduscencum] (1980), one of which his 
daughter bears directly to Beowulf (1981–83). Yet Hygelac also reminds Beowulf 
that he had “mistrusted” his adventure [siðe ne truwode] (1994) all along and had 
asked Beowulf to “let the South-Danes themselves make war with Grendel” [lete 
Suð-Dene sylfe geweorðan / guðe wið Grendel] (1996–97). By letting Beowulf know 
of his not having faith in Beowulf, Hygelac opens up a line of tension within his 
rewelcoming home of the local hero, who clearly understands the challenge (and 
possible peril) of not properly receiving Hygelac’s hospitality, when he concludes 
his story of his exploits in Hrothgar’s country by telling Hygelac,
“. . . ac he me (maðma)s geaf,
sunu Healfdenes on (min)ne sylfes dom;
ða ic ðe, beorncyning, bringan wylle,
estum geywan. Gen is eall æt ðe
lissa gelong; ic lyt hafo
heafodmaga nefne, Hygelac, ðec.” (2146–51)
[“. . . but he gave treasures to me,
the son of the Half-Danes, according to my own judgment,
that I to you, king of men, wish to bring,
to bestow willingly. On you, still, is all
joy dependent; I have few
near relations, Hygelac [except for] you.”]
In other words, Beowulf has to reassure Hygelac, through his hospitable (and 
loving) language and his gifts, where his loyalties as a warrior (and citizen of 
Hygelac’s Geatland) ultimately lie.
In the case of Wealtheow, as the wife of Hrothgar and hostess of the table of 
the Danish hall, it is her duty to give to Beowulf, following Grendel’s defeat, 
both wine and gifts, and to wish him good health and prosperity, and she does 
so, but not without also voicing her concern that Beowulf will always be kind in 
deeds to her sons [Beo þu suna minum / dædum gedefe] (1226b–27a). Wealhtheow’s 
anxiety over her sons’ future may very well be predicated upon her fear that 
her husband has gone too far in his hospitality and gratitude by having already 
spoken of Beowulf as a son [sunu] in his mind [ ferþe] to whom he would give 
everything he is able to give (946b–50). Hospitality, then, is not just a form of 
charity in this world, but is also a type of politics—a politics, moreover, that 
has its breakable limits, evidenced by the poem’s multiple digressions into sto-
ries about violence erupting in the very site of reception that makes hospitality 
possible at all: the hall itself. Therefore, in both the story of Hengest and Finn, 
told by Hrothgar’s scop after Beowulf has defeated Grendel (1071–1159a), and 
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also of the destruction of Heorot itself by the Heathobards, fi rst foretold by the 
poet (81b–85) and then later retold with great embellishment by Beowulf him-
self (2032–69a), we hear about the murder of guests in the halls of their former 
enemies, who have invited them there to share food, drink, and gifts (including 
women exchanged as brides), ostensibly to smooth over past enmities—which 
enmities obviously percolate very close to the surface of the structures of hospi-
tality designed to ameliorate them.
It is signifi cant, I think, that Beowulf asks Hrothgar, when fi rst arriving in 
Daneland to allow him to cleanse, or purify, Heorot [Heorot fælsian] (432b), the 
great hall of the Danes, which has been the chief object of Grendel’s attacks.80 
No hospitality (or politics) is possible while Heorot is polluted with the blood of 
Hrothgar’s subjects, many of whom have also abandoned the hall to sleep (and 
therefore, to reside) elsewhere (138–43), meaning that not only the hall itself, 
but also the space of sovereignty it marks, has been deserted. The Danish com-
munity, thanks to Grendel’s relentless violence, has no viable or pure center, no 
gleaming building with which to signify their supposedly generous hearts.81 But 
even without Grendel’s desecration of Daneland’s chief ceremonial and com-
munal space, as the poem makes clear again and again in all of its asides regard-
ing the feuds between Frisians and Danes, Danes and Heathobards, Geats and 
Swedes, and so forth, it is the men themselves who stain the fl oors of their halls 
with each other’s blood and also burn the structures of their communities down 
to the ground. As a result, the poem keeps in perpetual motion what Levinas 
defi ned as one of the more distressing tasks of alterity: defi ning “who is right and 
who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust.”82
In his terrifyingly excessive hostility, which the poet describes often as a form 
of hatred [nið, which can also mean ‘envy,’ ‘terror,’ ‘evil,’ and ‘spite,’ among 
a great many other connotations in the corpus],83 Grendel is the signifi er of a 
politics that transgresses the state, through terror, and thereby transfi xes its gaze.84 
Grendel’s violence challenges the code of hospitality that founds Hrothgar’s great 
hall (and by extension, the whole jural feud society of Daneland),85 while it 
simultaneously expresses a kind of excess of the very same violence that helped 
build that hall, for Hrothgar’s “wide” reputation and the wealth of his court 
are the chief byproducts of his and his troops’ “success in war” and “honor in 
battle” [heresped and wiges weorðmynd] (64, 65). And because Grendel’s seemingly 
senseless aggression encloses a kind of unconscious insistence on his own murder 
as the only possible end to that aggression, Grendel refuses conversation with 
Hrothgar and his Danes, and with Beowulf and his Geats, and thereby forcefully 
opens a way out of his solitude onto the plane of a certain futurity, which is the 
plane of his own death, but also of a history beyond the judgment (or sense) of 
those who would “translate” him into a battle trophy.
In that moment when Beowulf and his Geats return to Hrothgar’s court with 
Grendel’s severed head, which they have to drag by its hair across the fl oor of 
the great hall [be feaxe on fl et boren / Grendles heafod] (1647–48), the “terrible” 
and “splendidly-made spectacle” [egeslic and wliteseon wrætlic] (1649, 1650) of that 
head, upon which everyone gazes, is a marvel of alterity that, similar to the 
face of Zulikhan Elikhadzhiyeva, “gleams like a splendor but does not deliver 
itself.”86 Seth Lerer has argued that Beowulf ’s killing of Grendel can be viewed 
as a “rite of purifi cation” or “sacrifi cial act” by which Heorot is “cleansed” 
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[gefælsod] (1176), with the return of Grendel’s severed head to Heorot serving as 
the “token” or “sign” [tacne] (1654) of that purifi cation. Further, by delivering 
Grendel in parts, the monster’s body “may remain as parts, safe in their symbol-
ism and inactivity.”87But I would argue that there is something not completely 
benign or inert in the spectacle of Grendel’s head being dragged across the fl oor 
of Heorot, and whether it is tied to the rafter beams or left on its slaughter-pole 
[wælstenge] (1638), in the words of Jeff rey Cohen, “it smears the formal struc-
ture of the symbolic network with its obscene presence—its pleasures, delights, 
and destructions.”88 Further, as Carolyn Anderson writes, “the banishment of 
Grendel and his Mother does not rid the world of Heorot or Beowulf of disrup-
tions. The abject (repressed) persistently encroaches on and disrupts the symbolic 
order, so that the subject is always in process, on trial, and always insecure about 
the boundaries of identity.”89
Prior to their violent ends at the hands of Beowulf, Grendel, a “grim ghost” 
[grimma gæst] (102), and his mother, a “mighty mere-wife” and “sea-wolf” [mere-
wif mihtig and brimwylf ] (1519, 1599), live in the landscape that is wild and suppos-
edly unlivable, yet is also situated at the very margin, or border, of the so-called 
civilized world—specifi cally, Daneland, whose chief symbol, Heorot, is upheld 
by the poet as the “best of all houses” [husa selest] (146). Because Daneland’s pri-
mary symbol, the hall, is architectural—it is a thing made and built by human 
design and therefore articulates human identity—it stands in stark contrast to the 
fen paths, dark headlands, and burning mere that mark the monsters’ territory 
(1357–72). One could argue that the hall is not just a metonymy for Daneland 
(and for its authority), but is, in fact, Daneland itself, for the poet shares no details 
regarding any village or cultivated fi elds, or other outlying areas that would surely 
have attached to such a monumental seat of political and cultural power. There is 
something peculiar about this glittering and golden world whose light shines over 
many lands [lixte se leoma ofer landa fela] (311): the only things that really constitute 
Daneland are the shore that separates it from the rest of the world, the horn-
gabled hall, the paved stone road leading to and away from the hall, the blood and 
fl esh-splattered trail that leads to the monsters’ mere, and the outland territories 
of the monsters who are “out there” somewhere,90 calling to mind, again, Jeff rey 
Cohen’s argument that the monster resides “in that marginal geography of the 
Exterior, beyond the limits of the Thinkable, a place that is doubly dangerous, 
simultaneously ‘exorbitant’ and ‘quite close.’ ”91 Similar to the world evoked in 
King Lear, in which there are really only two places—the inside of the houses of 
degenerate power and the outside with its “all-shaking Thunder” and “House-
less heads”—Beowulf ’s world is partitioned between a sick and ruined civitas and a 
menacing wilderness.
Grendel is the chief border-crosser between these two worlds—a “fi end from 
hell” [ feond on helle] (101) who has spent twelve winters crafting crimes [ fyrene 
fremman] (101) against Heorot, he is not only Daneland’s chief terror, but also 
its chief terrorist. The descriptions of Grendel within the poem reveal both his 
inherent unknowability as well as his intimate familiarity, which both fascinates 
and frightens. He is a “powerful ghost” [ellengæst] (86), a “giant” [eoten] (761), 
a “dark death-shadow” [deorc deaþscua] (160), a “soul killer” [gastbona] (177), a 
“secret hatemonger” [deogol dædhata] (275), a “hell-secret” [helrunan] (164), and 
perhaps most importantly, because it is repeated so often, a “terror,” or “one who 
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plays with [or fi ghts] the law” [aglæca] (159, 425, 433, 592, 646, 732, 739, 816, 
989, 1000, and 1269).92 Although Grendel is defi nitively strange and monstrous, 
the poet also tells us that he and his mother are descended from Cain (104–14, 
1260–68), and therefore they share a human kinship with the other characters in 
the poem, while also bearing the mark of Cain’s pathology.93 As Ruth Melinkoff  
reminds us,
Grendel and his mother not only are plainly f leshly creatures but also clearly are 
more human than beast. Although the poet was sparing with physical descriptions, 
he provides some vividly revealing details: arms and shoulders (835a, 972a and 
1537a), claw-like hands (746–8a and 983b–90), a light shining from Grendel’s eyes 
(726b–7) and his head dragged by the hair (1647–8a). . . . Evil monsters, yes, but 
with human forms, f lesh and minds.94
Although Grendel never speaks within the poem, and therefore could be con-
strued by the Geats and Danes as being bereft of a rational or human conscious-
ness, the poet refers often to his mental states. As Katherine O’Brien O’Keeff e 
has pointed out, when Grendel fi rst approaches Beowulf after bursting into 
Heorot in the dead of night, “he is angry (‘[ge]bolgen,” l. 723; ‘yrremod,’ l. 726), 
his heart laughs (‘mod ahlog,’ l. 730), he shows intent (‘mynte,’ l. 731), and he 
thinks (‘þohte,’ l. 739).”95 More to the point of Grendel’s troublingly intimate 
exteriority,96 he is simultaneously the “elsewhere ghost” [ellorgæst] (807), “fi erce 
house-guard” [reþe renweardas] (770), and the “hateful hall-thane” [healðegnes hete] 
(142) whom Hrothgar calls “my invader” [ingenga min] (1776), pointing to his 
intertwined status with those who lie sleeping in the hall at night, and whom he 
kills and ingests during his visits there. It would appear that somehow, if even on 
an unconscious level, Hrothgar recognizes that Grendel is somehow his and the 
Danes’ personal nightmare, and even the poet mentions, at lines 152 and 154–55, 
that Grendel “had fought for a long time against Hrothgar” and “wanted no 
peace with any man of the Danish troop.” So, while on the one hand the Danes 
can claim not to know or understand Grendel, part of his ability to terrify them 
might be partly rooted in Hrothgar’s recognition that somehow and in some 
way, Grendel’s violence is recognizable as a kind of death-shadow of the very same 
violence that founded his own hall and might also have a more materially pal-
pable cause that attaches to specifi c persons or specifi c places.
That Grendel’s feud with Hrothgar’s court is personal, and that its original 
cause might somehow be rooted in Daneland’s ostentatious display of its wealth 
and power in its most visible articulation—the golden keep of Heorot itself—is 
evidenced in the lines, early in the poem, that Grendel “sorrowfully endured 
his time in the darkness, [and] suff ered distress, when he heard each day the 
loud rejoicing in the hall, the music of the harp, and the clear song of the poet” 
[earfoðlice / þrage geþolode, se þe in þystrum bad, / þæt he dogora gewham dream gehyrde / 
hludne in healle; þær wæs hearpan sweg, / swutol sand scopes] (86–90). One of the 
reasons Grendel may be particularly angry about this music is the subject matter 
of the song itself—God’s creation of the world (91–98)—for Grendel, as one of 
the deformed or “harm-shaped” creatures spawned by Cain, likely has a special 
grievance with God, and also with any men, like Hrothgar and his Danes, who 
appear to have been blessed by God. One visible sign of this blessing, aside from 
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the Danes’ material wealth, is the fact that, as the poet tells us in lines 168–69, 
because of God, Grendel could not approach or touch Hrothgar’s “gift-seat,” 
nor could he “know” God’s “mind” or “love.”97 Although the poet does not 
say so directly, we can assume that Grendel assumes that he is not, never was, 
and never will be welcome in the hall and the fi eld of un-welcoming that the 
hall radiates might be part of what undergirds his rage against the Danes who 
do not (and will not) recognize him as being part of their world such that they 
could even fathom the idea of welcoming him as a stranger-guest. Perhaps, too, 
Grendel simply hates all who are foreign to him and recognizes no sovereignty 
except his own, which sovereignty, moreover, he asserts through the elimina-
tion of all others whom he perceives to be in his way. This raises the question, 
too, of how Levinas’s unconditional hospitality can ever be possible in a world 
that has need of the idea (and force) of sovereignty.
When Beowulf fi rst arrives in Daneland and is explaining to the coast guard 
why he is there, as mentioned above, he reveals that he and his men have heard 
of this “unknown malevolence” [uncuðne nið] (276) that threatens the country 
of the Scyldings, and he wishes to off er Hrothgar counsel as to how he might 
vanquish this “I don’t know what kind of ravager” [sceaðona ic nat hwylc] (274). It 
could be argued that it is not fair to say that the Danes have not properly recog-
nized Grendel as belonging, in some fashion, to their world (if even as a type of 
structural excess), for Grendel stands in stark contrast to more identifi able human 
enemies—the Frisian or Heathobard who has been invited to dinner and is qui-
etly seething over old grudges, and whose killing sword is always close at hand. 
These are enemies whose worst motives are understood and even anticipated. 
Yet it is precisely this more familiar enemy that Beowulf identifi es as the ultimate 
cause of the undoing of Heorot when he returns to Geatland and explains his 
adventures in Daneland to Hygelac. In other words, it is other men, familiar fam-
ily members even, and not Grendel, who are Heorot’s real threat.
In his speech, lines 2000–162, which constitutes a second telling of his exploits 
(the fi rst having been already given to us by the poet), Beowulf, either through 
an amazing prescience or a smart reading of social cues he witnessed while at 
Hrothgar’s court, explains to Hygelac that Heorot will eventually be destroyed by 
a failed alliance with an old enemy, the Heathobards, through an arranged mar-
riage between Hrothgar’s daughter, Freawaru, and Ingeld, the son of Froda, chief 
of the Heathobards. Indicating to Hygelac that these kinds of alliances rarely hold, 
Beowulf states, “Often, after the fall of princes, in a short while the deadly spear 
fl ies, even if the bride is good” [Oft seldan hwær / æfter leodhryre lytle hwile / bongar 
bugeð, þeah seo bryd duge] (2029–31). In a strikingly creative moment, Beowulf then 
imagines the marriage dinner itself, still in the future, when the Heathobards will 
welcome the Danes into their hall to celebrate the wedding and, for all their good 
intentions, will eventually be galled by the sight of all the Danes in their glitter-
ing ring-mail, which they wrested from the dead bodies of the Heathobards on 
the battlefi eld (2032–40). Because the desire for vengeance always wins out over 
the desire for reconciliation (and even sex), violence naturally erupts, regardless of 
the protocols of hospitality that have been designed to avoid (or at least dull) such 
violent impulses.98
The poem speaks often of these seemingly ceaseless cycles of tribal violence and 
their horrifi c aftermath—the image of Hildeburh, in the Finn and Hengest story, 
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watching as the heads of her son and brother melt as they are being consumed on 
their funeral pyre, their blood bursting from the gashes in their bodies (1120b–22a), 
is a signature moment in this respect—but many of the characters do possess some 
prescience about this cycle, and they even have social codes to contain it some-
what.99 Some might argue, then, that Grendel is still worse than these familiar 
enemies because he represents an obdurately opaque type of mythical or archaic 
violence that will always be worse than anything the men can do to each oth-
er.100 More terrifying still, he cannot be fought with conventional weapons. When 
Beowulf requests that Hrothgar allow him to fi ght Grendel, he mentions that he has 
heard that Grendel, “in his dark thoughtlessness, does not care for weapons” [ for his 
wonhydum wæpna ne recceð] (434), and therefore Beowulf resolves to fi ght him with-
out sword and shield (437–40). Further, when Beowulf and Grendel are struggling 
together in hand-to-hand combat in Heorot, and Beowulf ’s men rush to defend 
Beowulf with their “ancestral swords” [ealde lafe] (795), the poet tells us that
Hie þæt ne wiston, þa hie gewin drugon,
heardhicgende hildemecgas,
ond on healfa gehwone heawan þohton,
sawle secan: þone synscaðan
ænig ofer eorðan irenna cyst,
guðbilla nan gretan nolde;
ac he sigewæpnum forsworen hæfde,
ecga gehwylcre. (798–805).
[They did not know, when they began the fight,
hard-minded warriors,
thinking to swing [their swords] in every direction,
to seek his soul, that [not any of ] the best of iron blades,
of any over the earth, nor any war-sword,
could greet that sin-shadow,
for he had forsworn battle weapons,
all sword-edges.]
Additionally, when Beowulf cuts off  the head of Grendel’s dead body with the 
ancient giant sword [eald sweord eotenisc] (1558) he fi nds hanging on the wall of 
Grendel’s mother’s cave (and with which he has also killed Grendel’s mother), the 
poet tells us that the blade of the sword burned up and melted due to Grendel’s 
“too hot” blood (1615–17), indicating, once again, the diffi  culty of penetrat-
ing Grendel’s body with conventional weapons. Ultimately, Grendel does not 
answer to standard forms of combat, which we can imagine contributes to his 
ability to terrorize. In this respect, Grendel appears to be pure, menacing alterity: 
he does not walk, talk, or fi ght “straight.”
While Hrothgar and his Danes and Beowulf and his Geats view Grendel and 
his mother as thoroughly Other than themselves, as Carol Braun Pasternack has 
pointed out, the language in the poem often belies the lines of diff erence that 
supposedly separate the men from the monsters, and thereby also reveals what 
might be called the poem’s  “political unconscious”:
Aglæca characterizes Grendel and the dragon and aglæcwif Grendel’s mother, 
but aglæca also characterizes Sigemund (893a), both Beowulf and the dragon 
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together (2592) and, in two instances, ambiguously either Beowulf or his mon-
strous opponent, in the f irst possibly Grendel (739a) and in the second possibly 
 mere-monsters (1512a). Klaeber struggles in his glossary to keep a clear distinc-
tion between hero and opponent, identifying the same term as, on the one hand, 
“wretch, monster, demon, f iend,” and on the other, “warrior, hero.” But, as 
George Jack recognizes in his edition, “fierce assailant” indicates the common 
ground for all the referents.101
Further, Pasternack explains that “The aglæcan are also wreccan, and this word and 
etymologically related terms point even more clearly to an oral-heroic paradigm 
in which hero and opponent fall within a single concept, the fi erce outsider.”102 
O’Keeff e has also remarked that the signifi cance of the term rinc [man; warrior] as it 
is applied to Grendel “is underscored by the number of the times the poet uses the 
word as a simplex or as part of a compound in the . . . description of Grendel’s actions 
in the hall [when he fi ghts Beowulf ]. ‘Rinca manige’ (l. 728), ‘magorinca heap’ 
(l. 730), ‘slæpende rinc’ (l. 741), and fi nally of Beowulf himself, ‘rinc on ræste’ (l. 
747), confi rm Grendel’s connection with the men in the hall.”103
Perhaps what is most troubling to the Danes is not Grendel’s status as either a 
monster or a man, so much as the seeming unstoppable and unknowable trajectory 
of his bloody incursions into Heorot. Early on in the poem, the poet notes that 
Grendel’s feud with the Danes was perpetual, that he would never make peace 
with any Danish man, he would not consent to settle the feud in any manner or 
by any payment, and he was not regretful about his murders (136, 152–58), all of 
which give to Grendel the status of an unknown horror who comes, again (geo-
graphically, tribally, mentally), from “I know not where.” In this sense, it is not 
possible for Grendel to attain the status of even the man who comes from afar (such as 
a Beowulf ) or alien person, which would, perhaps, make him worthy of some kind 
of welcoming, for not only his place (or tribe) of origin but also the causes of his 
hatred are completely unknown to the characters within the poem. But I would 
argue that this reading of Grendel belies what Hrothgar himself tells Beowulf 
about who Grendel is and where he comes from. Because it is only the poet who 
tells us that Grendel and his mother are descended from Cain (and this happens 
in two defi nitive instances at lines 102–14 and 1260–68), and therefore it is only 
the poet who acknowledges Grendel’s genealogical link to the human world, it 
is important, I think, to look closely at how Grendel’s chief enemy, Hrothgar, 
describes and perceives him. A key passage for understanding this—perhaps the key 
passage—is the somewhat lengthy speech Hrothgar makes to Beowulf (1322–82) 
after Grendel’s mother has burst into Heorot and killed Æschere, Hrothgar’s most 
beloved warrior, rune-counselor, and shoulder-companion (1325–26).
First and foremost, it is clear that Hrothgar understands that the “hand-
slayer” [handbanan] (1330) had a comprehensible motivation for her murder: 
“She revenged that feud when you [Beowulf ], last night, killed Grendel” [Heo 
þa fæðe wræc, / þe þu gystran niht Grendel cwealdest] (1333–34), and further, she 
“would avenge her kinsman” [wolde hyre mæg wrecan] (1339). At the same time, 
Hrothgar describes Grendel’s mother in somewhat oblique terms as a “wander-
ing slaughter-host” [wælgæst wæfre] (1331) who goes “I know not where” [ic 
ne wat hwæder] (1331) with her plundered body. But then, in a striking rever-
sal, Hrothgar shares with Beowulf some very specifi c details (albeit, borrowed 
from the hearsay of “land-holders among my people,” but also from counselors 
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[1345–46]) about who, exactly, Grendel and his mother are, and where they 
live. In what could even be called slightly excitable tones, Hrothgar explains 
that some people have seen “two similarly huge borderers, holding the moors, 
elsewhere ghosts” [swylce twegen / micle mearcstapan moras healdan,/ ellorgæstas] 
(1347–49), one of whom could “clearly” [gewislicost] (1350) be seen “shaped as 
a woman” [idese onlicnæs] (1351), and the other, “harm-shaped, tread the exile-
path in the form of a man, although he was much bigger than any man” [oðer 
earmsceapen / on weres wæstmum wræc-lastas træd, / næfne he wæs mara þonne ænig 
man oðer] (1351–53). Most important, I think, is that Hrothgar knows this ghost 
has a name, Grendel (1354–55), and that he has no father—given that this is 
a world in which patrilineal succession is so important, one could argue that 
Grendel’s fatherlessness adds one more layer to his dimension of frightening and 
unsettling uncanniness, while at the same time, the assumption that he should 
have a father (and is strangely lacking one) denotes that he is believed to be, like 
the Danes, a kin-defi ned person, even a human being. Finally, in this same 
speech, even though Hrothgar claims that Grendel and his kinswoman “guard 
a secret land” [Hie dygel lond/ warigeað] (1357–58), he then goes on, in shades of 
increasing hysteria, to describe in very precise detail this “wolf country”: there 
are fens, windy cliff s, mountain streams under dark bluff s, a fl ood under the 
earth, a lake with overhanging branches and frost-covered trees, and at night, 
strange fi res on the water (1357–76).
In Hrothgar’s emotional speech to Beowulf, we see that the margins of the 
world in which the “monsters” live are sublimely secret and treacherous, yet 
also geographically recognizable (and therefore, navigable). Likewise, the mon-
sters themselves, Grendel and his kinswoman, are both dark shadows, but also 
corporeally material and even human. It is fairly obvious, I would argue, that 
Hrothgar is afraid of the secret, yet familiar country in which Grendel and his 
mother live (otherwise, why hasn’t he already launched some kind of coun-
ter-off ensive there, or traveled there himself to survey the obstacles?), perhaps 
because he realizes that the diff erence of this landscape is, as Cohen writes, 
“arbitrary and potentially free-fl oating, mutable rather than essential,”104 just 
like the bodies of the monsters, or the bodies of the men who sleep within 
Heorot’s high walls. As René Girard has written, “Diff erence that exists outside 
the system is terrifying because it reveals the truth of the system, its relativity, 
its fragility, its mortality.”105 Grendel’s and his mother’s anthrophagy is very apt 
in this scenario because it both absorbs the warrior’s body “into that big Other 
seemingly beyond (but actually wholly within, because wholly created by) the 
symbolic order that it menaces,”106 and also disperses the warrior’s being, like so 
many pieces of fl esh, into the wilderness (a kind of anti-Heorot, the space where 
no hospitality, no state, and no law is thought to be possible). In fact, one of the 
most terrifying sights for Beowulf and his men when they seek out Grendel’s 
mother in her underwater den is the spectacle of Æschere’s head sitting on a cliff  
beside the burning and blood-swelled waters of the mere (1417–21). Later, when 
he returns home, Beowulf tells Hygelac how upset the Danes were that they 
could not properly burn Æschere’s body on a funeral pyre (2124–26). The mem-
ory of Æschere’s body having been both ingested and also discarded, almost as 
trash, along the tracks of the stateless forest, serves as a frightening rebuke to the 
idea that anyone could ever be safe, at home, from the enemy.
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By leasing Beowulf, as it were, to destroy Grendel and his ilk, Hrothgar is 
admirably doing everything he can to stop terror from enveloping and decimat-
ing his culture, to be sure, although it does raise the diffi  cult question, again, 
of the diff erence “between, on the one hand, the force that can be just, or in any 
case deemed legitimate (not only an instrument in the service of the law but 
the practice and even the realization, the essence of droit), and on the other hand 
the violence that one always deems just.”107 Grendel is so terrifying because, for 
the “hospitable” warrior-polis of Heorot, as Cohen writes, the “maintenance of 
order . . . is achieved only by the repression of those [murderous] impulses Grendel 
embodies,”108 but which nevertheless were once necessary for the building of 
Heorot, which then becomes the “law” that keeps violence in check through its 
alliances, man-payments, diplomacy, and when necessary, controlled reprisal. 
But as Robert Gibbs notes, “the positivity of law depends on a singular [vio-
lent] event, a revolution or war,” as well as upon the reiteration of that violence 
through the coercion that preserves the maintenance of the state.109 And what 
always puts the law in question (or peril) is the stranger-Other, such as a Grendel, 
for whom conformity is out of the question and whose violence appears to have 
no boundaries. Cohen writes that “Grendel represents a cultural Other for whom 
conformity to societal dictates is an impossibility because those dictates are not 
comprehensible to him; he is at the same time a monsterized version of what a 
member of that very society can become when those dictates are rejected, when 
the authority of leaders or mores disintegrates and the subordination of the indi-
vidual to hierarchy is lost. Grendel is another version of the wræcca or anhaga, as 
if the banished speaker of The Wanderer had turned in his exile not to elegaic 
poetry but to the dismemberment of the cultural body through which he came 
to be.”110 Levinas’s hospitality, of course, would not be able to succeed within 
any model of conformity; indeed, it depends on the appearance and welcoming 
of the non-conformist.
Ultimately, Grendel reserves for himself the privilege of murder that, typi-
cally, only the state (Heorot) can authorize, and similar to the suicide bomber 
who can never be caught or punished because she is already dead (and there will 
always be another to die again in her place), Grendel holds the place of a primal, 
sacrifi cial violence to which the only response is either fear and resignation or the 
unleashing of a force of the state that operates outside of the usual laws, such as 
a Beowulf (who is a “special force”). Indeed, it is precisely in Beowulf ’s “grap-
pling” with Grendel in Heorot (745b–818a), when Heorot literally resounds with 
Grendel’s “wailing cry” [wealle wop] (785) as Beowulf is ripping Grendel’s arm 
and shoulder from his body, that we can glimpse the fl uctuating structuration of 
violence that, tragically, has always undergirded this world.
According to Levinas, “The privileged role of the dwelling does not consist 
in being the end of human activity but in being its condition, and in this sense its 
commencement.”111 Without the dwelling, what Levinas calls “recollection”—
the “coming to oneself . . . which answers to a hospitality, an expectancy, a human 
welcome”—is not possible. It is not possible to know, of course, if the under-
water mere where Beowulf meets Grendel’s mother in combat functioned, in 
that way, as Grendel’s dwelling. But because of what we can imagine to be 
Grendel’s belief that Heorot mocks him and even denies him welcoming access, 
and because his home—to which he drags himself to die after Beowulf has torn 
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his arm out of its socket—is designated ahead of time by the Danes as everything 
that is un-homelike, Grendel exists outside the state as the fi gure of the “extra-
legal” and is beyond both his own and others’ “recollection.” Beowulf ’s murder 
and postmortem decapitation of Grendel represents what might have been for 
Grendel a devastating double-dispossession, especially when we consider that 
Beowulf fi rst drives Grendel out of the “high hall” that is the home of those who 
are supposedly blessed by a God whose regard Grendel cannot “know,” and then 
later, to add insult to injury, Beowulf desecrates Grendel’s body by slicing off 
his head in the “roofed hall” [hrofsele] (1515) of his mother.112 And this is a head 
that, tellingly, will take four men to haul it along the horse-path back to Heorot 
(1634–39), where, somewhat disturbingly, after being dragged across the fl oor to 
where the nobles are sitting on the benches, it becomes a spectacle for silent awe 
as well as a trophy (1647–50). The building of Heorot was made possible through 
the spoils of war, and Grendel’s severed head is the most visible marker of the 
monstrous, outsized rage necessary for founding that hall as well as the signifi er 
of the violent coercion necessary for maintaining the law of the hall that, in the 
fi nal analysis, is not predicated as much upon an ethics of hospitality as it is upon 
a force of exclusion that makes hospitality for some (as opposed to all) possible.
For the Danes, or even for Beowulf and his men, to even pause to consider 
how they might substitute for or subject themselves to a Grendel, to face him, 
as it were, without intermediary (Levinas’s face-à-face sans intermédiaire), would be 
to contemplate a justice that literally stands beyond the social totality (Heorot 
itself ) that makes thinking possible. It would be to go “where no clarifying—
that is, panaromic—thought precedes, in going without knowing where,” in 
order to grasp a “pluralism” that can never be totalized and without which peace 
can never be accomplished. It may be, as John Caputo has written of Derrida’s 
refl ections on the possible politics that could be founded by Levinas’s hospitality, 
that “[u]nconditional hospitality requires a politics without sovereignty,” and 
also a “community without community, a city without walls, a nation without 
borders . . . where the decision procedure for administration is based on a holy 
undecidability between insider and outsider.” And what would result would be 
a type of “holy hell” that is “the stuff  of sacred anarchy.”113 But how to imagine 
such an anarchic state of aff airs into administrative being? Or, to put the question 
another way: surrounded by so many bad deaths, both in the poem but also in 
our own troubled times, how to make way, hopefully, for its shining and chaotic 
arrival?
Although Grendel can’t dine anymore on the beautiful, shining bodies of the 
Danes, cracking their bones and gulping them down in chunks, nor does the 
light, which the poet calls “unbeautiful” [unfæger] (727), any more shine through 
his eyes, his head, suspended in the hall in a moment of Anglo-Saxon time, can 
keep watching them.114 He can keep gaping and warning as what Levinas would 
have called, not a face, but a façade “whose essence is indiff erence, cold splendor, 
and silence.”115 Likewise, Æschere’s head, left behind along the cliff  beside the 
burning lake where Grendel’s mother discarded it (1421), is also watching and 
warning. These, fi nally, are the faces of Beowulf that overfl ow the boundaries 
of all images and call into question the nature of the proper relationship of vio-
lence to justice, and to the sovereignty of the state. Along with the photograph 
of Zulikhan Elikhadzhiyeva, these “remains” are the expressions of persons 
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“brutally cast forth and forsaken in the world.”116 In addition to Heorot itself, 
once it is destroyed, they are also the “somewheres” of dwellings that can no 
longer open to themselves, but only to those of us who are willing to behold 
them, belatedly, with wonder.
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